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LEGALITY AND THE PERSECUTION OF CRIMES 
K. BÂRD 
Associate Professor 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest 
The author makes an attempt to define the notion of lega-
lity in criminal justice. In the course of this he points out 
the differences between legality and officiality /to proceed ex 
officio/, and also determines the element of the principle of 
legality. The study deals among these with the duty of the sta-
te to investigate crimes, in details. It calls the attention to 
the constitutional problems being rooted in the selective pro-
secution of crimes, which also appear as problems concerning 
the distribution of power between the legislator and the agen-
cies applying the law. The author challenges the principle of 
mandatory prosecution of all crimes because its enforcement 
cannot be granted which also raises constitutional tensions. 
1. Introduction 
Reform proposals urging to accelerate and simplify the ad-
ministration of justice in criminal cases, arguing for rationa-
lization and efficiency or even appealing to the interests of 
the defendant, have been presenting themselves more and more 
frequently in the literature of the law of criminal procedure. 
The ideas claiming for the increase of the role of the prepara-
tory procedure and the loosening of the principle of legality 
/mandatory prosecution/ in order to remedy the deficiencies of 
the criminal procedure have an important place within the re-
form proposals. As it seems, they are not at all unfounded; in-
stead, they have formulated a tendency from the recent history 
of criminal procedure. In fact, the absolute obligation of the 
authorities to prosecute crimes and to bring a charge has been 
moderated by more and more exceptions in the countries in which 
the principle of legality has been adopted as the milestone of 
the administration of criminal jusitce. 
By waiving prosecution /non-prosecution/, the authority pro-
Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 31, 1989 
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ceeding in the pre-trial phase pronounces a judgment on the ju-
dicial procedure declaring that the proceeding of a court is 
not needed in the given case.1 In addition, the competence of 
the prosecutor is not limited in many cases to the declaration 
that a judicial proceeding is senseless. Thus, the prosecutor 
may be authorized, and the police in some cases as well, to fix 
competences or to designate the agency that will enforce the 
penal claim of the state. The more, the prosecutor under the ru-
les of some legal systems is authorized even to place himself 
to the seat of the judge, to decide on the responsibility of 
the accused or to inflict a sanction on him, thus questioning 
the formerly immutable concept claiming an exclusive competence 
for the court concerning adjudication in criminal cases. 
2. War of principles 
The problem whether or not the prosecuting authority is 
entitled to settle a criminal case in its merits, precluding 
thus the court from pronouncing a judgment, is decided in the 
various legal systems depending on the preference given to the 
principle of legality or opportunity /expediency/. 
The dispute on the advantages and disadvantages of the two 
principles has been lasting long since, and it is continued 
even in our time frequently at the level of speculations, in a 
manner more recalling duels in rhetoric. Thus, the disputing 
parties prefer to argue by expressing appreciation for the va-
lues which, in their supposition, result neccessarily from the 
principle chosen by them. The birth of a reasonable dialogue 
is, of course, very difficult this way, as the partisans of 
"^Waiving prosecution is used here not in the sense as it 
is in paragraph 147 of the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure 
in force, saying that "The prosecutor may waive prosecution for 
a criminal offence which, compared to the criminal offence of 
greater weight made the subject of accusation is of no signifi-
cance." The concept of waiving prosecution should comprise here 
all cases in which the prosecutor omits to take legal proceed-
ings at a court although the conditions exist for initiating 
court procedure. The case mentioned above, in which aspects of 
economy in criminal proceedings are considered, pertains, of 
course, to the said group. 
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both camps may equally bring about convincing arguments, having 
this strength for themselves at least. 
Thus, the supporters of the principle of opportunity dec-
lare proudly that the principe of expediency is the necessary 
parallel element of modern, progressive, humanitarian criminal 
law concepts in the law of procedure, being a means for ratio-
nalizing the administration of justice at the same time, making 
it possible to distribute the resources in a reasonable way, 
and permitting the authorities to concentrate their efforts to 
fight crimes that would be particularly dangerous to the socie-
ty.2 
On the contrary, the supporters of the principle of legali-
ty have no confidence in any kind of discretion. In their view, 
"the power of discretion involves the risk of arbitrary decisi-
ons and the violation of equality. For this reason, opportunity 
is a doubtful concept for the rule of law from the very begin-
3 
ning." Beyond rejecting the recognition of the discretionary 
power of the prosecutor, there is a further argument claiming 
that the aspects serving as bases of discretion have usually an 
economic or political, i.e. extralegal nature. In this view, 
the consideration of financial considerations can be easily 
identified with market-minded bargaining which is evidently in-
compatible with the dignity of criminal justice and the moral 
4 
mission criminal law and procedure have to fulfil. 
Cf. e.g. RÖSTAD, H.: The Principle of Opportunity /of 
Expediency/. Considerations of Waiving of Prosecution Related 
to the Procedural System of Norway. Cahiers de Défense Sociale. 
Edition franco-anglaise 1984/85. p. 27.; HANSEN, и.: uie Tatig-
keit der Anklagebehörde in Norwegen, In: JESCHEK, H.H.: — LEI-
BINGER, R.: /ed./ Funktion und Tätigkeit der Anklagebehörde im 
ausländischen Recht. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 
1979. p. 509. 
3GERMANN, A.O. : Zum strafprozessrechtlichen Legalitäts-
prinzip, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1/1961. 
^Motivation to the Draft Bill of Criminal Procedure, 
submitted by the Minister of Justice to the House of Representa-
tives, in the fourth session of Parliament 1892/97. Pesti Könyv-
nyomda RT, Budapest, 1895. p. 155. 
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Honouring political considerations used to be regarded as 
risky, for the balance of the branches of power may be thus 
upset; as a result, the power of the executive may be extended 
to the prejudice of the legislative and judicial branch, at 
least in legal systems in which the prosecutor's offices are 
subjected to the minister of justice. "The rejection to make 
dependent the application of substantive law on individual con-
siderations or casual reasons of expediency is an elementary 
truth, to the extent that it is needless to prove it". This is 
from the motivation of the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure 
of 1896, with the following expoundings: "The law requires its 
unconditional implementation, and the realisation of its provi-
sions must not depend on the subjective views of anybody. If 
the legislator demands to take into consideration extra-legal 
aspects, this has to be declared in the law, including the de-
finition of the cases in question, and it cannot be entrusted 
to the discretion of the state or its individual agents. The 
strongest support of the legal order and the true content of 
the equality of rights appear just in that the aspects and mea-
sures of the assessment of diminal acts are constant and bind-
ing everybody. For this reason, the possibility of the non-
-application the criminal law from individual causes is exclud-
ed by the concept of the rule of law." The lengthy citation 
from the motivation of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justi-
fied here by the circumstance that the arguments expounded in 
our time in support of the legality principle are identical 
with those laid down in the text formulated almost a century 
ago. 
3. Approachment of the two systems 
The supporters of the two opposed camps are on the way, 
however, to judge their own system with a more reasonable app-
roach and with less prejudice in recent time. Evidently, a 
change took place in the views, i.e. the disputing parties came 
to recognize that instead of further speculation and rhetorics 
it makes more sense to observe, without prejudices, the every-
day operation of the two principles for which so many arguments 
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have been put forward in jurisprudence, in order to prove their 
superior values. 
As a result of empirical research, several authors got 
convinced of the fact that the assumptions formulated by the 
theoreticians as necessary accessories of this or that princip-
le are frequently not complied with in practice. The more empi-
rical research was not even needed to question the correctness 
of some of these hypotheses. In fact, it was sufficient to cast 
a prejudice-free glance to the course of legislation and the 
practice of the administration of justice. 
Several authors studying the principle of opportunity came 
thus to realize the existence of a difference between principle 
and the practice of the application of the law. Thus, Ulrich 
Hansen reported of the loss of the previous attractiveness of 
the principle of opportunity in the practice of the Norwegian 
crime control by the 1970-ies, not only in cases of adult per-
petrators but of juvenile delinquents as well. The agency autho-
rized to bring a charge is more and more inclined to submit the 
case to the court, provided that it detected it already and 
collected the means of evidence, so that the judge should be in 
charge of selecting the sanction.5 And this occurs inspite of 
the fact that the law confers a very broad discretional power 
to the prosecuting agency. Thus, the prosecutor is allowed to 
dismiss the charge "if, having assessed the details of the case 
in a comprehensive way, he came to the conclusion that the over-
whelming majority of the circumstances would justify to dismiss 
the charge". 
In a study investigating the changes of the administration 
of justice in the Netherlands, A.A.G. Peters drew also atten-
tion to the differences between principle and practice. Although 
the prosecutor enjoyed an almost complete liberty, under the 
provisions of the Code of Procedure, to bring a charge or not, 
practice made a rule of bringing the charge over a long period 
of time, and dismissal occurred only exceptionally. As long as 
5
 HANSEN: op. cit. p. 530. 
Paragraph 85 of the Norwegian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1887, and paragraph 69 of the Act of 1981 replacing it. 
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the prosecutor's offices made use of this practice, i.e. pro-
ceeded, actually, in the spirit of the principle of legality, 
the administration of justice was functioning in the Netherlands 
relatively without frictions, enjoying support and sympathy 
from the population. Nevertheless, as soon as the prosecutor's 
offices started to make use of the broad-scale discretionary 
powers granted them by the law, so that the proportion of the 
dismissals of charges was increasing, this discretionary power, 
conferred upon the police and the prosecutor's offices, was re-
garded more and more as "a suspicious and problematic aspect of 
the administration of justice in the Netherlands". Quite para-
doxically, the prosecutor's offices got exposed to the cross-
fire of attacks just at the time when they availed themselves 
definitely of the opportunity to proceed so as to meet the ex-
7 
pectations of the legislator. 
Furthermore, it became also clear that the objectives of 
criminal policy, coupled to the principle of opportunity, could 
be realised not exclusively by means of a broad-scale discre-
tion. Reference was made already in the preceding to the argu-
ment frequently expressed in favour of a broad-scale discre-
tional power, claiming that the administration of justice can 
be more efficiently adopted this way to social changes, not be-
ing obliged to take measures against those infringing obsolete 
statutory prohibitions not having the support of the general 
public. Nevertheless, it was then proved by the development of 
codification that the administration of justice could be reli-
eved from this uncomfortable task by legislation itself. It was 
required to this end to pay attention continuously to the chang-
es in the morale attitude in society, to the validity of the 
norms of criminal law, and to remove the obsolete provisions 
of criminal law from time to time. 
It was equally upon the effect of the changes that took 
place in the legislative process that the supporters of the dis-
cretionary power of the prosecutor came to understand the non-
9PETERS, A.A.G.: Authority in the Dutch Administration 
of Criminal Justice. Essays in Honour of Professor Shigemitsu 
Dando, Yuhikaku, Tokio, 1983. p. 180. 
158 
Legality of persecution 
-existence of a necessary logical relation between the princip-
le of opportunity and the relative theory of punishment. In 
fact, a relationship of this kind could be demonstrated only 
between the absolute theory of punishment and the principle of 
legality. The restitution of the legal order supposes the in-
fliction of a punishment by the court, and this latter implies 
the bringing of a charge in all cases. This does not prove, ne-
vertheless, the existence of a similar connection between the 
principle of opportunity and the relative theory of punishment, 
as these can be well put into harmony also with the principle 
of legality. Although it may be compulsory to bring a charge, 
the judge may be also authorized to meet the requirements of 
opportunity when fixing the penalty within the limits specified 
by law possibly by imposing penal measures /instead of a penal-
ty/ or even by omitting to inflict a penalty, provided that 
this is admitted by the rules of substantive law. The differen-
ce between the two systems concerns "only" the division of com-
petences; according to the principle of opportunity, it is the 
prosecutor who is authorized to assess the utility and expedien-
cy of imposing punishment and to take into consideration this 
when making the decision, while this authorization is conferred 
g 
upon the court under the principle of legality. 
The concept as to which the principle of opportunity as 
expressing the human treatment of offenders necessarily and at 
any time, so that an equitable administration of justice must 
be incompatible with the absolute obligation of bringing a 
charge, proved to be inappropriate as well. Doubtless to say, 
humane efforts aimed at an equitable application of the law 
played a role in the formation of the principle of opportuni-
ty.9 
HEYDEN, F.: Begriff, Grundlagen und Verwirklichung des 
Legalitätsprinzips und des Opportunitätsprinzips. Hans Schel-
lenberg Verlag, Winterthur, 1961. pp. 15-16. 
%"he fight between legality and opportunity in France is 
frequently mentioned as an example. According to a widespread 
opinion, practice favored ultimately opportunity for the rigour 
of the Code Pénal was thus softened. See: GERMANN: op. cit. 
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Nevertheless, the circumstances under which the principle 
of opportunity came into existence can only confirm that, due 
to the rigour and rigidity of substantive law, the aspects of 
equity could obtain a role in former times only through the in-
termediary of procedural law, through avoiding to bring the 
cases before the court. This is, however, absolutely insuffici-
ent to conclude to the immanent value and humanism of the prin-
ciple of opportunity. On the contrary, the circumstances of 
birth referred to above give support much more to the view that 
the principle of opportunity may loose its sense and function 
with the transformation of substantive criminal law. 
Besides, the myth of the necessary connection between op-
portunity and the equitable and mild treatment of criminals was 
refuted extensively by practice. As it is known, offenders are 
not relieved from the interference of social control in all ca-
ses by the omission of bringing a charge. In fact, in several 
cases non-prosecution simply means that an other organ and not 
the court will proceed in the case of the accused. Furthermore, 
it is also known, if not from other sources, than from the 
charges raised against the treatment ideology, that a milder 
and more humane treatment against the perpetrator is not at all 
guaranteed only by avoiding a judicial procedure. 
Finally, it became equally clear that the broad discre-
tionary power granted to the agencies prosecuting criminal cases 
was, by itself, insufficient to ensure the rationality of crime 
control policy. Also in legal systems based on the principle of 
opportunity, it is mostly "harder" factors, beyond the organs 
charged with the prosecution of crimes that in fact, will af-
fect decisively the types of criminal behaviour to be revealed 
and judged by a court. Some of these factors are e.g. the visi-
bility of the act, the possibilities of bringing evidence and 
first of all, those influencing the population's inclination 
to report. Accordingly, the scope of the acts that can be, and 
are actually, prosecuted is determined to a significant extent 
by the types of injuries which become known to the investigat-
ing organs from the injured persons and the population, respec-
. . . 10 tively. 
1 0
 HANSEN: op. cit. p. 512. 
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At the same time, it became also clear, and again mainly 
from the results of empirical researches that the hypotheses 
coupled to the principle of legality were not always valid in 
pracitce, as the discretionary power of the authorities respons-
ible for the conduction of a criminal procedure cannot be ex-
cluded even by the statutory prescription of the mandatory pro-
secution of criminal cases. First, one must not be a fanatical 
supporter of the free law school to admit that criminal law 
contains a number of uncertain concepts with an unclear meaning 
and their interpretation opens the way, evidently, for discre-
tionary assessment. 
The very theatre of discretion is, however, fact-finding 
and proof-taking. To bring a charge is mandatory namely only 
if the case is suitable for the judicial proceeding, at least 
according to the principle of legality in its sense used to be 
interpreted in our time. However, the degree to which the act 
in question can be regarded as confirmed by evidence, depends on 
the discretionary assessment of the authority prosecuting crime 
First, the members of these authorities will decide on the ef-
forts to be taken in order to bring to light the various types 
of criminal acts and the intensity devoted to collect evidence. 
Second, they are vested with remarkable and hardly controllable 
powers in assessing the weight evidence when deciding whether 
or not a particular case is "mature" for a judicial treatment. 
Furthermore, the process of determining the intensity of clear-
ing up and the discretionary assessment of the weight of evi-
dence may be influenced by criminal-policy considerations of 
the prosecutor's office. 
Research findings on the proof-taking activity of the 
prosecutor's office suggest, furthermore, that the separation 
of the competences of the branches of power is not guaranteed 
by the principle of legality. In fact, the prosecutor may de-
prive the legislator of his competence when, making use of his 
monopoly of prosecution, or abusing it, respectively, utilizes 
his authorization to direct the procedure of proof-taking fre-
quently "to decriminalize the lower regions of criminality".33 
lief, for Finland e.g.: JOUTSEN, M. - KALSKE, J.: Pro-
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Similarly, it has been confirmed by practical experiences 
that the prescription of mandatory prosecution does not ensure 
the citizens' equal treatment before the law by itself. On the 
contrary, there is evidence that a fanatical insistence on the 
principle of legality may provoke just the opposite effect to 
what was the original intention. This occurred in Italy where 
legality was raised to a constitutional principle in 1947, and 
the code of procedure stipulated that the prosecutor was not 
allowed to discontinue procedure on his own initiative even in 
case of the insufficiency of evidence; his only right was to 
make a motion to the examining judge to terminate the proceed-
ings. 
As a result of unflexible regulation, the courts became 
incapable to comply with the excessive quantity of unsettled 
work charging them. Ultimately, the capacity of functioning of 
the administration of justice could be maintained by the cancel-
lation of numerous procedures, for the limitation period having 
passed, and the parliament granted grace the accused almost 
without selection. Thus the situation of those subjected to 
criminal proceedings became, however, still more insecure, and 
the principle of the equal treatment by the law suffered a 
u u 12 
breach. 
It was equally Italy's example which drew attention to the 
risks of the formal observance of the principle of legality 
whereby the legislator might be compelled to introduce institu-
tions which could be still less adopted to the existing legal 
system than cautious concessions to expediency considerations. 
In fact, it is admitted under article 162 of the Italian 
Criminal Code that the accused of criminal acts of minor weight 
secutorial Decision-making in Finland. National Research Insti-
tute of Legal Policy. 67. Helsinki, 1984. p. 23.; for the FRG: 
SESSAR, K. : Legalitätsprinzip und Selektion. Zur Ermittlungs-
tätigkeit des Staatsanwalts. In: GÖPPINGER, H.: — KAISER, G.: 
/ed./ Kriminologie und Strafverfahren. 12. Ferdinand Enke Ver-
lag, Stuttgart, 1976. pp. 155-156. 
12 ZAGREBELSKY, V.: Alternatives to Criminal Proceedings 
and within Criminal Procedure in a System Where Prosecution is 
Mandatory. Effective, Rational and Humane Criminal Justice 
HEUNI Publications No. 3. Helsinki, 1984. p. 257. 
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may "compensate" themselves from the inconveniences of further 
proceedings by offering a sum fixed in the law. If the judge 
accepts the offer, he terminates the proceedings. Up to 1981, 
this institution made it only possible to handle criminal acts 
punishable by a fine in this milder way. Nevertheless, its sco-
pe of application was then extended to cases in which, beside 
a fine, detention was prescribed by the law as an alternative 
13 
punishement. Evidently, no detailed comments are needed to 
make it feel that this model of sentencing, recalling plea-
-bargaining as it is known in the American legal system, is ab-
solutely alien to the continental concepts in the law of pro-
cedure. 
As a result of the relevant recognitions, the systems of 
procedure based on two opposite principles came somewhat closer 
to each other in recent time. 
The efforts aimed at restricting the extremities that were 
experienced in the practice of bringing charges confirmed the 
changed attitude in the systems accepting expediency considera-
tions. Thus, various guiding principles, circulars, etc. were 
issued by the top instances of the prosecuting agency in Eng-
land, Wales, Denmark, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, destined 
to serve the unification of the practice of bringing a charge, 
in the name of equality and justice. 
At time same time, self-examination can be undoubtedly ob-
served also on the other side. In fact, it seems that the cri-
sis of legality is deeper if the two principles are inspected. 
This statement is confirmed in that the loosening of the prin-
ciple of legality is not only in the plans in countries where 
mandatory prosecution is prescribed by law but minor or major 
concessions to the demands of opportunity have been already 
made in almost all of these countries in the form of legisla-
tion. 
As regards the systems in which the prosecutor has the 
discretionary right to decide on the expediency of bringing a 
AMODIO, E. : Diversion and Meditation /Italy/. Revue In-
ternationale de Droit Pénal, 3/4/1983. 
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Charge, on the other hand, the weak points of the principle of 
opportunity became, no doubt, clear so that efforts were made 
with a view to unify the prosecution practice, however, the va-
lues inherent in the principle of opportunity have never been 
questioned, however. Thus, inspite of the actual intentions to 
set limits to the possible abuses of the prosecuting authori-
ties, the replacement of opportunity by the system of the man-
datory prosecution has not been in prospect in any country so 
far. 
Contrary to the afore—mentioned, the view claiming that 
the prosecution of all criminal acts and the mandatory presenta 
tion of an indictment covering all cases would be impracticable 
and, in addition to it, would imply unbearable consequences, 
has been expressed quite frequently by scholars in countries 
adopting the principle of legality. These theories made thus a 
virtue of what was judged earlier a deficiency. In other words, 
the said theories declare the fundamental idea of the principle 
of legality to be worthless. Other views, although not ques-
tioning the values assumed to be linked to the principle of le-
gality, consider the principle of opportunity more appropriate 
for the realisation of these values, strange as this may seem. 
It is convenient here to quote the closing thought of K. Ses-
sar's study mentioned in the preceding: "... it is questionable 
whether or not the principle of opportunity, based on the re-
cognition of the necessarily selective character of the prosecu 
tion of crime bears in itself the risk of unequal sanctioning 
as it has been stated again and again. On the contrary, it can 
be easily thought that it is just the principle of opportunity 
which would make it possible for the prosecutor to judge the 
cases in an equality-based way concerning also their content, 
„14 
beyond the only formally equal consideration. 
4. Legality and officiality 
The principle of legality appears as a command for the 
prosecuting authorities, prescribing for them that the criminal 
14SESSAR: op. cit. p. 164. 
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law is to be applied. Accordingly, the principle of legality 
states an obligation, i.e. that of the enforcement of the de-
mand of punishment.''"8 
On the contrary the principle of officiality, i.e. ex of-
ficio procedure, frequently dealt with together with legality, 
formulates a right. In fact, it gives an authorization the sta-
te organs set up for this particular end to enforce the demand 
of punishment irrespective of the consentment of other persons, 
the more, even contrary to their will. 
Just as officiality, the existence of the principle of le-
gality can be attributed to the changes as a result of which 
the penal system became part of public law. Both principles can 
be envisaged only as recently as "the state coupled the concept 
of social injury to a criminal act" i.e. no more considering 
it as a private injury. 
The common condition of the birth of these principles might 
be the cause of the inclination, experienced with both the le-
gislation and the jurisprudence, to see a necessary connection 
between the principles of legality and officiality. The more, 
these two principles used to be treated as if they had the very 
same meaning. Thus, it is laid down in paragraph 2. of the Hun-
garian Code on Criminal Procedure in force that "in the presence 
of the conditions established under this Act the authorities 
acting in criminal cases shall be bound to conduct criminal 
proceedings". Accordingly, the obligation to act is prescribed 
by the law, and this under the pretext of ex officio proceed-
ings, i.e. replacing the principle of legality by that of offi-
ciality. Evidently, the legislator adopted here the theoretical 
concept arguing for the unity of rights and duties in the pro-
secution of crime. In fact, this view can be traced in the li-
terature, its summing up reading that once the state acquired 
the exclusive right of the prosecution of crime, it is bound, 
18SZABÓNé , N . T . : A büntető igazságszolgáltatás hatékony-
sága /Efficiency of the administration of criminal justice/. 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest. 1985. p. 35. 
16Motivation to the Draft Bill of Criminal Procedure of 
1986. p. 148. 
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at the same time, to take care of the enforcement of the demand 
of punishment. Nevertheless, this argument is inappropriate for 
confirming the coincidence of officiality and legality. In fact, 
it is only a moral demand or, better, a recommendation, just as 
saying in for a penny in for a pound, i.e. the obligation of 
the prosecution of crime would result necessarily from the right 
of prosecuting crimes. 
It seems to be justified to give a separate treatment to 
the principles of officiality and legality, and this is not a 
consequence of an inclination of systematizing, frequently rea-
ching an excessive extent with the practitioners of criminal 
law but the recognition that, instead of showing a necessary 
interconnection, the two principles are, in fact, just opposite 
to each other in some aspects. While the principle of officia-
lity gives the basis of the power of the prosecuting mechanism 
of the state, the concept of legality sets limits to that power. 
It is known that officiality, as a necessary element of 
the inquisitorial process obtained general recognition and use 
in the canonical procedure at the time when Pope Innocent III 
set as his purpose the strengthening of the power and authority 
of the papacy as a condition of the world-wide power of the 
17 
Church. To confirm officiality, the pope referred to two ci-
tations from the Bible. The first, from the Genesis, read as 
follows: "Then the Lord said, Because the cry of Sodom and 
Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous; I 
will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether ac-
cording to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I 
will know." The other may be found in Luke's Gospel in the pa-
rable on the untrue steward, saying: "And he said also unto his 
disciples, There was a certain rich man, which had a steward; 
and the same was accused unto him that he had wasted his goods. 
And he called him, and said unto him, How is it that I hear 
17 
For a comprehensive commentary to the formation of of-
ficiality and the inquisitorial procedure cf. MÖRA, M. —KOCSIS, 
M.: Magyar büntetőeljárási jog /Law of Hungarian criminal proce-
dure"! A university textbook!/Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1961. 
pp. 67-68. 
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this of thee? give an account of thy stewardship; for thou may-
18 
est be no longer steward. 
It needs no more explication that, just as it is clear 
from the two citations from the Bible, only the right of prose-
cuting crime is formulated in the institution of inquisition of 
the Church and no mention is made of the obligation of prosecu-
tion. 
The principle of officiality gained ground later also in 
the secular administration of justice as it proved to be appro-
priate for strengthening political power. By analogy with the 
central power within the Church, the absolutism as developed at 
the end of the Middle Ages saw in the principle of officiality 
only a means to remove an obstacle to the prosecution of crime. 
Unwilling to recognize any limit for itself, it expropriate I 
the monopoly of prosecuting crime, without undertaking, however, 
19 
an obligation to exercise it. 
The principle of officiality was prevailing in the crimi-
nal procedure already long since when, and this happened in the 
19th century, the legality was also acknowledged as a fundamen-
tal principle of the administration of criminal justice by po-
sitive law. This is, evidently, a plain refutation of the view 
claiming the necessary identity of officiality and legality. 
The circumstances of the birth of legality show a clear 
difference from the conditions and efforts which brought into 
existence the principle of officiality. Evidently, its content 
is completely different as well. Legality is an inherent ele-
ment of the concept of the constitutional state, with a strict 
separation of the application of the law from legislation, set-
ting limits for the competences of the prosecuting organs. 
With the declaration of legality the state promised to submit 
its prosecuting mechanism to the law and the legislator, res-
pectively. In fact, it is pronounced by the concept of legality 
1 8 
SCHULZ, W.: Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Akten-
einsichtsrechts im Strafprozess. Rechts- und Staatswissen-
schaftliche Fakultät der Philipps Universität zu Marburg. Mar-
burg, 1971. p. 10. 
1 9
 GERMANN: op. cit. 
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that, once the legislator commanded the punishment of an act, 
the organs applying the law are bound to avail themselves of 
their monopoly of prosecution upon the suspicion of a criminal 
offence, so that the legislator's intention be thus realised. 
With the obligation of conducting the criminal proceedings, 
allowing no exceptions, the prosecuting authorities are exclu-
ded from the possibility of availing or not availing themselves 
of their powers, made dependent on their own interests or other 
extra-legal factors. 
The differences in the content of the two principles can 
be demonstrated very spectacularly with the admitted exceptions, 
2 0 
although it has been also common to regard them as identical. 
If the prosecuting organs are invested with power by virtue of 
the principle of officiality, their power will be evidently di-
minished by admitting exceptions to the principle. The institu-
tion of the private complaint means e.g. that the legislator 
cuts out a part of the competence of the prosecuting agencies 
for itself and the injured party. In fact, the legislator de-
limitates thus the interests deemed worth of excluding the de-
mand of punishment of the state, setting thus a limit to the 
power of the organs applying the law. With this, the injured 
party is thus authorized to assess the pros and cos of the en-
forcement of the claim for punishment together with the right 
to take the final decision. Accordingly, the enforcement of the 
claim for punishment depends on the decision of the injured 
party, i.e. as long as his or her consentment is given, the 
prosecuting organs are not allowed to proceed. 
Contrary to this, the power of the prosecuting organs will 
increase to the prejudice of the legislator with the breach of 
the principle of legality. In fact, they are exempted from 
obedience and are authorized to disregard the decision of the 
legislator in which some harmful forms of behaviour have been 
defined as criminal acts. 
The examination of the exceptions to the two principles in 
20 
SZABÓNÉ, N.T.: /ed./ Magyar Büntetőeljárási jog. Egy-
séges jegyzet /Law of Hungarian criminal procedure. A universi-
ty textbook/. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982. pp. 92-94. 
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question leads to the point that officiality and legality are 
concepts replacing each other; nevertheless, they are by no 
means interconnected. It must be clear from the above said 
that, with a restriction to any of the two principles, the le-
gislator will recognize aspects or interests that exclude the 
claim for punishment. The difference comes from the legislator's 
decision charging this or that party to assess the interests 
favouring or excluding prosecution. 
In case that the legislator takes a stand leaving to take 
the decision, in the form of a private complaint, authorisation, 
etc. , by those for whom the enforcement of the demand for pu-
nishment may be harmful, he may then insist on the principle of 
strict legality. Conversely, by insisting on the inviolability 
of the concept of officiality, the rigidity of the penal system 
may be attenuated by charging the prosecuting authority with 
the task of assessing the respective interests, loosening thus 
the rigour of legality through loosening the principle of man-
datory prosecution. 
With a comparison of the provisions in the legislation of 
the Scandinavian countries which, besides, show numerous common 
traits, it can be confirmed that the above expoundings are far 
from a merely theoretical Construction. It is Finland whose law 
demonstrates the most consequent insistence on the principle of 
legality, at the "price", however, that the most criminal of-
fences to be prosecuted upon the complaint brought by the vic-
tim may be found in the Finnish law within the criminal codes 
of the Northern countries. As to the number of the criminal 
acts for which criminal proceedings are conducted upon the com-
plaint of the victim, Sweden is second to Finland. The axiom of 
legality is laid down here as the rule of the code of procedure 
but its rigour is attenuated by a high number of exceptions. 
/It is worth mentioning that, parallel with the concessions to 
the aspects of opportunity, the scope of the criminal offences 
to be prosecuted upon the victim's complaint only was restirct-
ed in Sweden./ Finally, the line is closed by Denmark and Nor-
way. As the procedural laws of these countries are based upon 
the principle of opportunity, the number of priváté complaint 
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21 
offences is here the lowest. 
5. Obligation of detection 
As a consequence of the principle of legality, the autho-
rities are bound to prosecute criminal acts. It must be evident 
from the introduction that this obligation is composed of ele-
ments that can be separated from each other. In its broadest, 
and strictest, sense the precept of legality contains, in fact, 
the commands that 
— the investigating organs should detect all crimes and 
identify all perpetrators; 
— the prosecutor should present an indictment in all cases 
If the factual and legal conditions of a judicial procedure 
exist, should demand the decision of the court in all cases and 
22 
should make full use of appealing; 
— the court should impose a penalty on all perpetrators. 
The said partial obligations are interrelated but their 
addressees are different persons or organs, and their contents 
are not identical either. Accordingly, the distinct elements of 
the obligation of prosecuting crime can be also examined sepa-
rately. 
The first command resulting from the principle of legality 
prescribes that no criminal act should remain undetected and 
without being punished. The authorities are thus expected to 
trace any injury and to detect all perpetrators of criminal 
acts. 
The irrealistic content of this requirement is already 
well known. Thus, when the principle of legality is mentioned 
as a "norm of a programme", the recognition of the existence of 
the law and the actual possibilities of their fulfilment is, in 
fact, in the background. 
21 
JOUTSEN, M.: Comparative Approaches to Crime Victim 
Policy In Europe. /Mimeographed material prepared for the annu-
al meeting of the American Association of Criminology San Die-
go, California, November 13 to 17, 1985./ p. 5. 22For the prosecutor's obligation see: LUKÁCS, A.: A bűn-
vádi per előkészítő része /Preoaratory part of criminal proce-
dure/, Lepage L., Kolozsvár, 1904. p. 82. 
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The present degree of knowledge of the mass of hidden cri-
minality and of the proportion of actual perpetrators who can-
not be identified and succeed thus in escaping from being pu-
nished has considerably contributed, beyond any doubt, to the 
devaluation of the principle of legality. With the actual ten-
sion between the command and the hopelessness of its fulfilment, 
all further elements of legality are weakened. In plain words, 
if it is known that a considerable number of criminal acts will 
never become known to the authorities and an important number 
of the perpetrators escapes punishment, then the command invit-
ing the prosecutor to present an indictment and the judge to 
impose a penalty will definitely loose from its convincing and 
compulsory force. 
It may be surprising, at the first glance, that the lite-
rature of criminal procedure took, and has been taking, hardly 
note of the afore—mentioned aspect of the obligation of prose-
cuting crime. Actually, the obligation of presenting an indict-
ment has been treated traditionally under the pretext of the 
principle of legality. In fact, it is highly probable that both 
the degree and the structure of hidden criminality have not 
been independent from the activity /or inactivity/, of the 
prosecuting mechanism. Hence, part of the criminal acts remain 
undetected for the authorities have been deliberately unwilling 
23 
to take notice of them. 
Nevertheless, the absence of scholars of procedural law 
from this field is understandable. First, for them the term 
criminal procedure was identical with the court procedure for a 
long time. In fact, this latter could include, apart from the 
court trial and the appellate procedure, the examination /Unter-
suchung/ at most out of the phases of the preparatory procedu-
re, for only this was led by an inpartial judge so that it was 
indeed contradictory with a litigating character. The investi-
gation /Ermittlung/ represented already an other category. In 
any case, the subject-matter of the procedure used to be alrea-
dy more or less fixed when the examination is ordered, also the 
23KIRALY, T.: A legalitás a büntetőeljárásban /Legality 
in criminal procedure/. Manuscript, Budapest, p. 10. 
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person of the supposed perpetrator is known, consequently a 
detecting, researching, and revealing activity was here already 
out of consideration. 
Notwithstanding, it is hardly justified to make reproaches 
to those studying procedural law for their choice, as they ex-
amined just what was offered them for research by the positive 
law. Accordingly, no reproaches are justified, essentially, to 
the jurisprudence of procedural law of the before 1945 for hav-
ing missed to deal with the problems of investigation intensi-
vely, in view of the fact that the examination has been treated 
in six chapters with 153 paragraphs in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1896, and the legislator found 18 paragraphs suffici-
24 
ent for the problem of investigation. 
With the subsequent withdrawal of the examination and the 
recognition of the significance of the investigation no changes 
occurred, however, i.e. the jurisprudence continued to be dis-
interested in the point whether or not there was a relationship 
between legality and the detecting and revealing activity of 
the authorities, the undetected field and the way the prosecut-
ing organs are proceeding. 
The cause of indifference is, however, clear also in this 
case. True, the investigation is closer to the detecting acti-
vity aimed at the delimitation of injuries than the examination, 
both in time and in its methods. Nevertheless, the subject-mat-
ter of the criminal procedure is constituted by the "demand of 
the state, originating from the perpetration of a punishable 
act and aimed at the punishment of the perpetrator of the act 
25 
concerned." Hence, the perpetration of a criminal act, i.e. 
the existence of the demand for penalty of the state or, more 
precisely, the supposition of its existence, constitutes a con-
dition of the procedure. Accordingly, the norms of criminal pro-
cedure become effective only with the birth of a suspicion that 
a criminal act was committed. For the law of procedure, suspici-
on is of interest only as the "final product", i.e. its course 
24LUKÁCS: op.cit. p. 174. 
2
^FINKEY, F. : Büntetőeljárás k. ny. e.n. /Criminal pro-
cedure/. pp. 5-6. 
172 
Legality of persecution 
of formation is uninteresting, consequently it is not covered 
by its scope of regulation. Similarly, it is outside the inte-
rest of the law of procedure under what circumstances the poli-
2 g 
ce obtained the informations that founded the suspicion. 
In fact, the rules of the law of criminal procedure do not 
cover the so-called proactive activity, of a revealing and re-
searching nature, destined to detect injuries that are still un-
known. For this reason, the science of the law of procedure can-
not be blamed for having omitted to analyze the relationship 
that may be supposed between the dark field and the authorities' 
way of functioning. 
As a matter of fact, science is at liberty to disregard 
the frames laid down by positive law. Nevertheless, almost un-
surmountable obstacle appears in this case. In fact, this is a 
field making orientation impossible, in the almost complete ab-
sence of published rules which would give the science the re-
quired orientation. In view of this complicated and delicate 
conditions, the interests of prevention, public order and, the 
more, the success of the prosecution of crime may easily come 
into conflict with the command of legality. It is, furthermore, 
2 6 
The high attention paid to the starting date of func-
tioning of the law of procedure is spectacularly demonstrared 
by the Hungarian Code of Procedure now in force. Thus, the well-
-founded suspicion of a criminal act is declared as condition 
of the institution of proceedings among the fundamental provi-
sions of the Code. At the same time, criminal proceedings may 
be instituted on report, on notice, or on the observation of 
the investigating authority, as it is laid down in paragraph 
121 of the Code. There is not a complete harmony between the 
two provisions, as a report is not always sufficient for form-
ing a well-founded suspicion, consequently for instituting cri-
minal proceedings. Doubtless to say, priority is due to the ru-
le of fundamental importance of the Code, laying down the fac-
tual condition of instituting proceedings, when the conflict 
between the two afore-mentioned provisions is regarded. This 
possible conflict is released, however, by the very text of the 
Code, allowing to complete a report. In this process various 
acts of proceedings may be then carried out, to confirm or dis-
pel the suspicion. Taking into consideration, nevertheless, 
that the actual criminal proceedings were not instituted by 
that time as yet, the completion of the report cannot form part 
of the investigation either. For this reason, special provisi-
ons are to be considered for the procedural acts in question 
instead of the general rules of the procedure /see item 51. of 
the instructions No. 4/1980 BM of the Minister of Interior /. 
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a paradox situation that, the stricter conditions are laid down 
by the law for invoking criminal proceedings, with a view to 
reduce this way the possibility of the unjustified and unneces-
sary molestation of the citizens, the broader will be the ex-
tent of the deregulated field within the activity of the autho-
rities, withheld from recognition and control. 
The lack of interest in the selective activity of the auth-
orities may be surely attributed to the circumstance that a 
systematic research work in latent criminality has been started 
only recently. True, the fact that part of the criminal acts 
and their perpetrators remained undetected was known also pre-
viously. In the absence of authoritative research findings, 
the "law of constant conditions" claiming that total criminali-
ty was represented by the known cases, could hold its stand 
2 7 
firmly. If the registered and the undetected criminality 
have, in fact, the same structure, and the detected and the un-
known offenders have the same characteristics, then legality 
retains its validity, as a "norm of programme" at least. The 
dark field can be explained by imperfect prosecution so it is 
only a flaw that can be removed. Thus the full realisation of 
the command of legality requires not more than the increase of 
the quality of prosecution; even the increase of the staff may 
be sufficient. In terms of the "law of constant conditions" the 
delicts that become known get to the surface from the mass of 
the criminal acts by a selection at random. The actual structu-
re of criminality is not distorted by the selective interferen-
ce of the authorities; as a result, science can remain with the 
analysis of the data registered by criminal statistics. It has 
thus no sense to confront the thesis of legality with the autho-
rities way of proceding as no regularities will be revealed. 
2"7cf. KÖRINEK, L. : A látens bűnözés vizsgálatának mód-
szertani kérdései. Dolgozatok a közgazdaságtudományok köréből 
/Methodological problems of the investigation of latent crimi-
nality/. Pécs, 1985. p. 3.; SACK, F.: Dunkefeld. In: Kaiser -
- Kerner - Sack - Schellhos /ed. / : Kleines Kriminologisches 
Wörterbuch. С.F. Müller, Heidelberg, 1985. p. 81.; SCHIMA, К.: 
Entwicklungstendenzen in der Kriminologie. In: Strafrechtliche 
Probleme der Gegenwart. 4. Bundesministerium für Justiz, Wien, 
1976. p. 91. 
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Nevertheless, research findings questioning the "law of 
constant conditions" came to light in an increasing number from 
the 1960-ies onward. Recent investigations studying latent cri-
minality which referred no more to "estimates based upon every-
day professional experiences" but, instead, made use of the 
2 8 
methods of empirical sociology indicated an actual differen-
ce between the structures of the dark field and registered cri-
minality. They refuted also the thesis which claimed the identi-
ty of the characteristics of registered offenders and those who 
remained undetected. In particular, the common conception was 
questioned which stated a close relationship between social sta-
29 
tus and criminality. 
The difference between latent criminality and that regis-
tered in criminal statistics led the suspicion, understandably, 
to the crime control agencies. The assumption that the differen-
ce in the structure of registered and complete criminality is 
due to the selective way of proceeding of the prosecuting or-
gans, seemed to be reasonable. This suspicion was confirmed by 
investigations carried out with the method of sociological ob-
servation. They indicated, indeed, that, in the absence of ap-
propriate checking, the prosecuting organs selected the reports 
of the population that led to the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings not exclusively on the basis of legal criteria. Thus 
they have had the liberty to take decisions at their discre-
tion, without being checked, whether or not a conduct in a given 
situation is qualified as infringement of a penal norm. They 
have been, furthermore, in a position, by selecting the targets 
of their proactive activity to pre-determine to scope of crimi-
nal acts and the group of the offenders that will be then figur-
For the two fundamental methods of research in latent 
criminality see: SACK: op. cit. p. 80. 
29Cf. SACK: op. cit. p. 83.; PFEIFFER, D.K. - SCHEERER, 
S.: Kriminalsozioloqie. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1979. p. 23.; 
CHRISTIE, N. : Scandinavian Criminology Facing the 1970's. Scan-
dinavian Studies in Criminology. Oslo - Borgen - Tronsa, 1971. 
Vol. 3. p. 126. 
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ing in criminal statistics.30 
Depending on the personal approach of those applying the 
law, the idea of selection resulted either in that they took 
offence at it,refused or they felt remorse. Those, however, who 
suffered from a bad conscience found support in their naive op-
timism. As they argued, the recognition of the fact of a dis-
torting selection meant already the first step toward its eli-
mination. With this in view, it was only the question of good 
intentions and honour that those administering justice apply 
the statutory rules not in a selective but in a "compensating" 
way, thus eliminating discrimination doing injustice to the lo-
wer social groups concerned.31 
The reply given to the research findings on latent crimi-
nality by sociologists was, however, not so naive. Being objec-
tive and unimpassioned, they declared that selection and the 
disproportionately high representation of the handicapped soci-
al groups within the registered offenders was a necessary im-
plication of the administration of justice in hierarchically 
structured societies. This view was summed up most strikingly by 
H. Popitz in his work "The preventive effectof non-knowledge"32 
According to the initial thesis of Popitz, a society in 
which all violations of law are detected is not only unbearable 
but it destroys even its own norms. In fact, the criminal law, 
the administration of justice, and penalties may namely fulfil 
their useful functions, i.e. the increase of solidarity within 
the group, the maintenance of the intensity of collective fee-
lings, etc. only as long as the infringement of norms appears 
as an exceptional phenomenon, without becoming known all over 
the society. 
30 
See: SCHIMA: op. cit. p. 94.; FEEST, J.: Die Situation 
des Verdachts. In: Feest, J. - Lautmann, R.: Die Polizei. So-
ziologische Studien und Forschungsberichte. Westdeutscher Ver-
lag, Opladen, 1971. pp. 71-92. 
For this view cf.: SCHÜNEMANN, H.W.: Selektion durch 
Strafverfahren? Die Bedeutung des labeling approach für unser 
Strafverfahren, Deutsche Richterzeitung, September 1974. 
POPITZ, H.: Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens, 
Recht und Staat, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1968. p. 350. 
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Latent criminality, i.e. non-knowledge is thus in the the-
ory of Popitz not only a necessary phenomenon; on the contrary,, 
it is to be welcome. The tension between the necessary rigidity 
of the norms and the flexibility expected from the administra-
tion of justice is then released by non-knowledge; overlooking 
the breaches of the norms that became obsolete, their life can 
be prorogated. Thus, there will be no obligation to revoke the 
dying rules, reducing the way the respect of the entire norm 
system. Non-knowledge will also help to the formation of a fa-
vourable image on the validity of the norms in the society. On 
the contrary, the frequent ventilation of the breaches of norms, 
i.e. drawing public attention to these affairs would reveal 
that the rules are much more sensitive to injuries than it is 
desirable. 
In the view of Popitz, sanctioning is evidently a matter 
of social status. Indeed, the respect of the norms is not at 
all independent from the prestige of those who breached the 
norms and were put on the pillory. With the punishment of of-
fenders in a high social stand the reputation of the penal sy-
stem may be improved but the respect of the violated norm will 
suffer from it without doubt. 
Summing up the preceding, it is clear that, as soon as the 
frequency of the application of sanctions passes a given limit, 
it becomes incapable to comply with its useful functions. The 
social efficiency of sanctions can be preserved only as long as 
they appear to be exceptional, i.e. as long as the majority 
does not get what it would deserve. Thus, the preventive power 
of sanctions subsists only as long as the preventive effect of 
non-knowledge is upheld. 
6. Lessons 
Empirical research on hidden criminality was started in 
33 
Hungary only recently , an the selection by the authorities 
33 
Cf. also for the history of investigations in latent 
criminality: KÖRINEK, L.: Rejtett bűnözés /Hidden criminality/. 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 1988. 
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was qualified a taboo for a long time. True, it happened almost 
15 years ago that L. Viski formulated his integrated theory of 
criminality and, within this context, the analysis of the se-
lection by the authorities and the procedure of definiton in 
3 4 
the process of becoming a criminal. His concepts had a pro-
ductive effect upon the theory of criminology; nevertheless, 
Hungarian criminology hardly started to analyze the problems of 
legal policy and constitutional law as well as the consequences 
for criminal policy originating from the selection. The follow-
ing remarks are limited to consider the dilemma affecting the 
relationship between legislation and the application of the law. 
It was mentioned in the preceding that the principle of 
legality pronounces the rule of law and the primacy of the le-
gislator. Accordingly, the organs applying the law are subjec-
ted to the legislative organs, they are bound to comply with 
the volition of the legislator, and are not entitled to consider 
at discretion the enforcement of the law. It was also dealt with 
that, as compared to the said principle, the idea of opportuni-
ty constitutes a release for those applying the law from their 
strict submission. Nevertheless, the legislator retains his 
predominant role even if he makes concessions to considerations 
of opportunity. Anyway, he reserves the right for himself to 
delimitate the frames of discretion even if this is made fre-
quently using diffuse concepts, such as references to the cir-
cumstances of the given case, etc. 
On the other hand, it is a self-containment of the legisla-
tor if, although the command of legality is prescribed, but it 
is clear that the organs applying the law are unable to comply 
with it. By declaring legality, the legislator disclaims to de-
limitate the actually existing and, the more, unavoidable, dis-
cretion. Under these circumstances the prosecuting organs are 
compelled to define, on their own, the kinds of criminal con-
duct that should be prosecuted, and the offences to which they 
can turn a blind eye. It would be unjust to blame them for this, 
34 
VISKI, L.: Integrált bünözéselmélet és közlekedési 
kriminológia /Integrated theory of criminality and the crimino-
logy of traffic offences/. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 9/1973. 
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as the legislator charged then here with an impracticable task 
diverting, at the same time, his responsibility for specifying 
the relevant priorities. 
I 
All this should not say, however, by no means as if the 
conditions outlined above were desirable or even acceptable. 
First, professional reservations would disfavour to allow the 
prosecuting authorities to decide on their own, without being 
checked, to concentrate their resources to the prosecution of 
this or that kind of criminal conduct. True, their professional 
competence cannot be doubted, i.e. they must have the widest 
knowledge of the entirety of criminality. Nevertheless, organi-
zational interests, performance-mindedness, the promise of a 
quick and easy success or the expectations of the public may 
frequently induce them to become incapable to assess, in an ob-
jective way, the forms of behaviour that are particularly dan-
35 
gerous to the society, and it may be hardly possible to cor-
rect and erroneous decision subsequently. In fact, once the 
prosecuting authoriy took the decision to proceed to action, it 
will furnish the evidence confirming the correctness of its de-
cision by itself, and the rule of the "self-fulfilling prophecy 
will work, i.e. with the increase of the intensity of detection 
the proportion of the criminal acts selected for prosecution 
will grow within registered criminality, confirming thus, ap-
parently, the correctness of the selection. 
Beyond professional reservations, a further argument aga-
inst . the uncontrollable selection of the prosecuting organs 
reads that the achievements attained in the field of the in-
crease of the professional level of legislation and the admin-
istration of justice and their democratization will have thus 
only a relative value. Large-scale professional and social dis-
cussions preceding codification will be of no use it he selec-
tion of the norms, actually being enforced, will be withdrawn 
from the checking of those entitled to legislation and of the 
general public. 
35 
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The consequences of the foregoing expoundings make it im-
perative to face openly the limits of legality, to make public 
and thus controllable the process of decision in the course of 
which the "piths of prosecution" are formed, and to lay down 
the results in a public norm. 
Evidently, this is a very delicate and difficult task as 
fixed reflections have a paralysing effect. Anyway, we think 
that the norms of criminal law have a concrete effect by their 
very existence, even without making them actually operated and 
we are afraid that, by an open declaration of the selective pro-
secution of criminal behaviour the supposed general preventive 
effect of the norms would be reduced. 
Nevertheless, a solution has to be found. Continuing to 
delude ourselves and refusing to face the fact openly that the 
demand of legality is impracticable, we would agree with the 
views of Popitz unavoidably, i.e. accepting his thesis that the 
order of society can be maintained only by deception and mis-
leading the general public. Also, we would accept thus the idea 
of a certain complicity of those engaged in legislation and the 
application of the law: the legislator would declare, indeed, 
the demand of legality knowing, at the same time, the impossi-
bility of prosecuting all injuries to the law, as well as its 
undesirability. On the other hand, the prosecuting organs would 
take care for the continued "fragmental" application of crimi-
nal law, so that the breach of a norm remain an exceptional 
case and the majority should not get what it would deserve. 
ЛЕГАЛЬНОСТЬ И УГОЛОВНОЕ ПРЕДСЛЕДОВАНИЕ 
К. Бард 
Автор попытается выяснить понятие легальности. В ходе 
этого он указывает на различия между легальностью и производ-
ством экс оффицио и разделяет тезис легальности на элементы. 
Из этих последних подробно изучаются проблемы, связанные с обя-
занностью раскрыть преступление. Автор обращает внимание на 
конституционно-правовые дилеммы, вытекающие из селективного 
уголовного преследования, а также на проблему разделения вла-
стей между законодателем и правоприменителем. В связи с этим 
ставится вопрос об обоснованности жесткого придерживания тези-
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ca безусловного уголовного розыска при условии, что это ставит 
перед органами уголовного розыска неразрешимую задачу. 
LEGALITAT UND STRAFVERFOLGUNG 
К. Bárd 
Der Author versucht die Klärung des Begriffes der Legali-
tät, und beweist im Laufe deren die Abweichung von Legalität 
und Offizialität /Verfahren amtswegen/, schliesslich erörtert 
die einzelnen Elemente der Legalität. Darunter erörtert die 
Studie am eingehendsten die Probleme, die Aufklärungspflicht 
der Straftaten betrifft. Es wird aud die verfassungsrechtlichen 
Dilemmas hingewiesen, die sich auf der selektiven Strafverfol-
gung ergeben, sowie auf das Problem, welches sich daraus ergibt, 
dass eine gewisse Verschiebung der Macht zwischen der Gesetz-
gebung und der Rechtsanwendung feststellbar ist. In Zusammen-
hang damit wird die Frage gestellt: ist begründet auf die These 
der bedingungslosen Strafverfolgung bestehen, wenn die Erfül-
lung dieser These für die strafverfolgenden Behörden eine un-
lösbare Aufgabe bedeutet. 
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